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The Integration of Responsibility and Values: Legal 
Education in an Alternative Consciousness of 
Lawyering and Law 
Howard Lesnick1 
Howard Lesnick is one of the founding faculty members of CUNY 
Law School with primary responsibility for the development of the 
curriculum. He served on the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School faculty for over twenty years and has visited at Berkeley, 
Chicago, Columbia, Michigan, NYU, Stanford and Texas. He is 
widely known for his work in labor law and in legal representation 
of the poor, and is a co-author of Becoming a Lawyer: A Human­
istic Perspective on Legal Education and Professionalism (1981 ) . 
A. Responsibility 
I see the primary aim of legal education as enabling students to be 
responsible in the practice of law. The core meaning of the idea of 
responsibility is the recognition that the choices one makes as a lawyer 
have an effect on people's lives. From this recognition flows the realiza­
tion that our work as lawyers can be an affirmation, or a negation, of 
our values, of the goals that we want our lives to strengthen. In my 
view, the first task of a law school is to help students to explore the 
fuller meaning and implications of responsibility in law practice. This is 
the "understanding" aspect of learning to be responsible. 
In addition, we must give students some of what they need in or­
der to be responsible. Knowledge of legal doctrine and skill at lawyer-
1. I have been working at CUNY since it began to develop a new curriculum 
designed to educate students to practice with an orientation to the public interest. 
What follows is an informal sketch of the central premises of the CUNY curriculum. I 
am grateful to Charles Halpern, Dean of the Law School, for his confidence and sup­
port in the effort to develop and implement a thorough examination of the goals, con­
tent, and methods of legal education; and to John Farago and Jack Himmelstein, 
faculty colleagues with whom ! worked closely in the initial planning year and whose 
ideas - and, in many instances, whose language - are as deeply embedded in this 
essay as they are in the CUNY program. 
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ing tasks are a crucial part of what one needs to be responsible. Tradi­
tional legal education tends to value this skill and knowledge in itself, 
and they become the goal rather than a means toward reaching the 
goal. A person needs such qualities as the ability to analyze and syn­
thesize legal principles, a keen sense of relevance and procedure, and 
the ability to organize and present a coherent and persuasive line of 
reasoning in speech and writing. A person needs, however, far more 
than these traditionally valued skills, in order to be a responsible law­
yer. The "more" includes the wider range of skills associated with 
clinical teaching in the narrow sense, such as interviewing prospective 
clients, examining witnesses, or drafting pleadings or interrogatories, 
but goes beyond them to include more qualitative skills - listening, 
exercising judgment, and engaging in moral reasoning are major exam­
ples - as well as matters going beyond skill, such as developing knowl­
edge of oneself and of the premises of the legal and the social order. 
The CUNY curriculum seeks to implement the emphasis on re­
sponsibility in two major ways: first, through the emphasis on Ia wyer­
ing, and on the integration of lawyering with iaw; second, through the 
commitment to make explicit the values dimension of law and of lawy­
ering. Through these means, our hope is to enable and encourage stu­
dents to interact more actively with respect to their own learning, and 
to their developing identity and evolving choices regarding their work 
as lawyers. Our aim is to see students as people, and to teach them to 
see themselves as people. Our admissions process is designed to look for 
applicants who seem open to engaging in that process, and we endeavor 
to ask them to ask themselves, throughout the three years, what they 
want to become as lawyers. 
The centrality of responsibility, and its meaning, apply to the 
School as an institution as much as to the individuals in it. The idea of 
an "implicit curriculum" is that much of what we teach is transmitted 
by the attitudes and practices that we model. A lot of this has to do 
with the way a lawyer treats those over \vhom he or she has power. 
This involves such diverse areas as the way that students experience the 
School in the application process, relations of faculty and students with 
the non-professional staff, and the way that people in the cases are 
treated in professorial comments and class discussion. 
The responsibility of the School also involves our approach to stu­
dent "problems" - that is, our willingness to interact with students as 
people with regard to their entire life situation, not simply the develop­
ment of their minds in the courses. We have responsibility for conse­
quences, such as those flowing from the cost of tuition and the contours 
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of the market, even though we do not intend them. The need to provide 
on-site child care is for me an aspect of this question. The placement 
process is another example, both our responsibility to aid students to 
find work consonant with their values, and what we say to students 
about what a "good" or prestigious job is. It means little to talk about 
equality and societal needs as values while reinforcing by our conduct 
the widespread tendency to give people our attention - and our honors 
(invitations to speak, awards, pictures on the walls) - on the basis of 
prestige, titles, and authority. 
The relevance of the idea of the responsibility of the institution 
applies to the explicit curriculum as well. It suggests, primarily, the 
shaping of each course through a commitment to purpose rather than 
coverage. When I say "rather than," I recognize that there is often a 
purpose to coverage: Examples are basic literacy regarding legal terms, 
an awareness of historical development, even particular judges or theo­
ries. In each instance, however, material needs to be presented in a 
context that attempts to make a link to the purpose of the course or of 
the overall program. The effort should be to overcome two kinds of 
fragmentation: First, the split of law from thought, that is, seeing law 
simply as doctrine, the product of reasoning or analysis; this is the em­
phasis on theory. Second, the split of thought from action, seeing prac­
tice simply as rather low-level cognitive or interpersonal skills, divorced 
from both law and values; this is the emphasis on practice and 
lawyering. 
It is obviously necessary to make choices regarding subject matter 
and method. In every case, however, it is important to keep asking why 
a certain thing is proposed to be taught, or taught in a certain way, or 
to a certain extent, or with something else, and then to ask why again 
about the reason given as an answer. The purpose of asking why is to 
enable us to become aware of the premises and priorities that trigger 
our choices, so that we can make responsible decisions about them. 
That process might change our choice, or shape it in a new way, or 
lead us to reaffirm it. 
Consider, as a subject-matter example, the question whether the 
lease is a conveyance of an interest in land or is a contract. That can be 
taught to illustrate the force of history in the evolution of doctrine. It 
can also be taught to illustrate the instrumental landlholder-orientation 
of the common law. It can be taught as a lesson in realism, to empha­
size that the perception of what a lease "is" is a normative, not a de­
scriptive, process. I find it attractive - and this may be only a further 
development of the realist purpose - as a way of teaching the legiti-
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mating quality of legal concepts: Calling a lease a conveyance, and 
teaching about it in Property (separate from Contracts), reinforces the 
idea that it is just for the tenant to bear the risk of loss, since, after all, 
the subject of the sale, the leasehold, is still the tenant's. The sharp 
political change that has given rise in many jurisdictions to the "war­
ranty of habitability" is no more a logical result than the former one. 
Using the term "warranty of habitability" makes the landlord seem 
like a welsher, for not delivering on a promise, and facilitates the con­
clusion, which now seems right to many of us, that it is just for the 
landlord to bear the risk of loss. The function of legal reasoning, there­
fore, is to make it seem logical and, indeed, inexorable, that one result 
(or the other) be reached. The existence of choice is unmasked by pen­
etrating the legal concept and seeing it as a construct that facilitates a 
particular result. For me, teaching the issue for that purpose is particu­
larly salient, for it reinforces the idea of unperceived choice, which is at 
the core of both legal regulation and law practice. 
A similar process applies with respect to methods of teaching. One 
may favor a problem/simulation/clinical emphasis on the ground that 
lawyers need to learn the skills of witness preparation, cross examina­
tion, and the like. I would then ask why they need to learn it, and learn 
it in law school, and whether we want at the same time to avoid having 
them learn other things that go along with learning those skills as 
skills. That process for me leads to a somewhat broader answer (which 
still has the acquisition of skills as an important goal): Putting students 
in role repeatedly is intended to evoke a desire on their part to under­
stand subject matter, including the subject matter of doctrine as much 
as the subject matter of forensic skills. More broadly, it rests on the 
notion that application is a critical part of what it means to understand 
subject matter, that in a real sense one cannot anderstand law separate 
from its application. Finally, it rests on the belief that only by exper­
iencing a role can students learn to exercise choice about its place in 
their practice. These purposes would surely lead one to include a 
clinical focus, but its content and method would be shaped by one's 
objectives. 
B. The Traditional Consciousness of Law and Lawyering 
The foregoing discussion, in my view, illustrates the recurrent need 
to "step back" from content sufficiently to be able to understand the 
assumptions underlying that content, and the implications of it. One 
may step back, as above, in order to look at purpose. Stepping back 
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also permits a look at an overall framework or consciousness. By the 
word "consciousness," I mean a set of mutually reinforcing premises, 
priorities, or perceptions, which are for the most part either implicit or 
axiomatic. 2 
Many of us experience important dissatisfactions with central as­
pects of law, lawyering and legal education, and the last two decades 
have witnessed the emergence of a number of "alternative" structures 
that tap this dissatisfaction. In practice, the public interest law firm, 
law collectives, and the practice of mediation are examples; in law, le­
gal realism, Ia w reform, and critical legal theory; in legal education, 
the clinical education and humanistic education "movements". Each of 
these responses, while achieving important change, has often suc­
cumbed to two related dangers: First, they are marginalized, seen as 
something apart from the mainstream world of law and law practice. 
They tell a student, teacher or practitioner that, unless he or she aban­
dons the traditional route entirely - becoming a mediator, public in­
terest lawyer, community organizer, or leaving "the law" entirely -
the traditional rules remain in force. Second, there is a strong tendency 
for alternative structures to pick up the underlying framework, and 
come more and more to look like what was left behind. The struggle of 
public interest and legal service Ia wyers over issues of accountability to 
clients is an example. My premise is that there is a consciousness that 
underlies the traditional framework and influences our actions, even 
when they are an explicit expression of dissatisfaction with central as­
pects of that framework. Unless that consciousness is made explicit, it 
cannot be made the subject of choice, and choice cannot be exercised at 
a level sufficiently fundamental to implement the impulse that may 
have generated it. 
The central characteristic of the traditional consciousness of la wy­
ering is the primacy of role, whether it is the role of attorney, student, 
or teacher.3 Answers are determined a priori, by large categories of 
situations: "As a lawyer, . . .  ;" "as an associate, . . .  ;" even "as a 
radical. . . .  " The concept of role is premised on the denial of respon­
sibility; it sees the impact of one's work on people as the responsibility 
of the system as a whole, and not of the individual lawyer. It is impor-
2. See Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor 
Law, 32 BUFF. L REv. 833, 84 1-43 (1983). 
3. Among the many analyses and critiques that have appeared in the past dec­
ade, I find most helpful one of the earliest: Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: 
Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS I ( 1975). 
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tant to recognize and acknowledge that it is often real pressures, real 
problems, real needs that give rise to the role definition; the answer, 
however, comes to be taken for granted in new situations without a new 
connection to the underlying need or function. For example: "As an 
advocate, I don't worry about what happens to my client's adversary 
because of his or her lawyer's incompetence." The problem of taking in 
the "enemy" as a person is an extremely agonizing one in many situa­
tions - we could not practice law without some recognition of this 
message - and the concept of role tells us that we are not involved in 
that process. In the traditional consciousness, the rightness of the ob­
jectification of the adversary is viewed as self-evident, and not to be 
reappraised in particular cases.4 
The traditional consciousness sees iaw as rules promulgated by 
some accepted source, and applied through a process of reasoning in a 
general, impersonal, procedurally fair way. The aim is to restrain and 
regularize power over individuals by defining spheres of rights and du­
ties, within which each of us may pursue his or her own ends. lt is for 
this reason that the emphasis is on adjudication; the determination of 
fault is the premise of finding that one has invaded another's rights. 
The traditional consciousness rests on an underlying value system 
that shapes and is reinforced by it. First, it manifests a view of the 
world as one of scarcity, populated by self-aggrandizing, competing in­
dividuals, each having subjective and arbitrary desires, and character­
ized by their awareness of separateness from one another. Second, it 
emphasizes achievement, energy and mastery. In this value system, 
government's legitimate concern is with the preservation of peace and 
order; it is both the primary source of oppression and - through its 
creature, the law- the primary protection against oppression. Auton­
omy is equated with "being left alon�," and the function of society is 
seen as to provide a system of mutually beneficial exchanges among 
individuais. Justice tends to be regarded as the natural product of 
transactions among individuals (a market or process view of justice), 
and the dominant social order as iegitimate and presumptively just. 
4. A uniquely powerful statement of this phenomenon is Mark Twain's THE 
WAR PRAYER. See Gary Friedman's and my comments, in E. DvoRKI01. BECOMING A 
LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 
202-07 ( 1981) [hereinafter cited as Becoming a Lawyer]. 
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Equalitarian work place, respectful of people as individuals 
This consciousness embodies much that we value: The notion of 
the rule of law as a restraint on discretion and a limitation on arbitrary 
power, the unleashing of individual energy and diversity, the respect for 
fair procedure as an independent value. The problem is the partial 
quality of the traditional consciousness. To summarize with egregious 
brevity: First, procedure is not all that we care about. Second, the cer­
tainty and impartiality suggested by the traditional notion has over and 
over been proven illusory. The legal realist critique made clear long ago 
that there is choice, most particulary when it is being denied by legal 
formalism; the clear implication - which there is a strong tendency to 
shrink from making, or adhering to - is that the attempt to separate 
law from politics is illusory at best, and a mystification. Third, the illu­
sion of certainty does not simply mean that results are capricious (in 
the sense suggested by the legendary realist concern over what the 
judge had for breakfast) . The rules transmit existing power arrange­
ments. Rules, language, and the process of fact-finding, are inherently 
indeterminate, and emotions and values fuel adjudication as well as 
legislation. 
C. Polarities and Synthesis: Approaching an "Alternative 
Consciousness" 
In looking at what an alternative consciousness might be, it is im­
portant to begin by considering explicitly the tendency to express a re­
jection of the traditional in polar terms. What is wrong with the tradi­
tional consciousness is that it is incomplete, that it becomes a 
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caricature of reality, a caricature of the human personality. I t  seeks to 
protect certain values that are generally important - individual self­
expression, for example - and is unwilling to respect other values out 
of a fear that that can be done only at the cost of the first set. An 
example- drawn from legal education rather than lawyering- is the 
widespread resistance to clinical education based on an asserted fear of 
an abandonment of "rigor" in intellectual analysis. Upon realizing the 
limited nature of the traditional consciousness, it is easy to react by 
becoming caught in its polar opposite, which, although fashioned on 
opposite values than the traditional, is similarly unidimensional and 
partial. So, teachers drawn to clinical education often find themselves 
denying that intellectual rigor has substantial positive value. 
A non-polar alternative consciousness seeks to incorporate the 
traditional in a broader view, holding to what is worth holding to, but 
insisting on a more situational consideration of consequences and the 
possibility of respecting the aims of apparently inconsistent values. The 
hoary academic debate, between rigor and values or intellect and emo­
tion in studying cases, is a classic example of this polarized form of 
thinking. We are usually required to decide which pole repels us the 
most, so that we can cling desperately to the opposite one. Rigor and 
values are conflicting only from a linear perspective; in "rejecting" 
rigor, '>ve are rejecting only the claim of completeness for it, in order to 
seek a broader value, one that includes rigor and includes values as 
well.5 
An alternative consciousness of lawyering expresses a view that at­
tempts to go beyond both the traditional adversary consciousness and a 
polar rejection of it. The central theme is not the rejection of role, but 
a dynamic relation between role and self, which involves an interaction 
among awareness of choice, responsibility for choice, and values. 
Legal thinking has barely begun to articulate the content of a gen­
uinely alternative consciousness of law. The prevailing legal responses 
to date have accepted much of the critique of traditional consciousness, 
but have refused or failed to foilow the implications of that critique. 
The widespread attempt to discover values that are shared in the com­
munity recognizes that it is a value system, and not a process of rea­
soning, that is at work. Yet, following Holmes' example - the true 
inputs are the "felt necessities of the time" - approaches as disparate 
as Hart & Sacks in the 1950's, Ronald Dworkin, and much of the Law 
5. See E. DvORKIN. supra note 4, at i59-74. 
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and Economic movement today, regard the significant values as more 
or less inherent, whether discoverable through economic analysis, "rea­
soned elaboration," intuition, or revelation. These approaches are being 
seriously challenged by critical legal theory, which sees them as legiti­
mation mechanisms, that rationalize and justify domination, in part by 
hiding it, and that, to a greater or lesser degree, continue to define 
"societal needs" in a way that is responsive to such values as productiv­
ity, hierarchy and the mobility of capital.6 
The central elements of an alternative consciousness of law seem 
to me to be: a) seeing law in terms of the values underlying the rule 
rather than the rule itself - "The Jetter killeth, but the Spirit giveth 
life;" b) seeing justice as responsive to human needs, in the sense of the 
concrete reality of people's lives, to outcomes as well as process; c) see­
ing human needs in a way that is not fully captured by the notion of 
rights and duties, that is more interactive. The appropriateness of me­
diation (rather than adjudication) as a means of processing some im­
portant differences among people in this consciousness is simply that it 
is a procedure that has the potential to respond to what becomes 
important. 
D. The Integration of Responsibility and Values 
To teach students what it means to be responsible is to attempt to 
empower to do so those who would choose to do so. That effort is im­
portantly different from teaching students that they ought to be respon­
sible, in a way that bears on the central question whether the emphasis 
on responsibility has any values impiication. To the extent that it does 
not - that it is simply asking people to act out of authenticity, in 
congruence with their own values, whatever they may be - it seems 
woefully incomplete, and oriented only to a narrow form of personal 
fulfillment. To the extent that there is substantive values content in the 
idea of responsibility, there is concern, first, that the content is being 
left unexpressed and, second, that its legitimacy is open to question and 
that students are being manipulated or indoctrinated in an institution­
ally determined value orthodoxy. 
My hypothesis is that a fully developed concept of responsibility 
can resolve the dilemma between these two poles, that the idea of re-
·6. See, e.g., Robert Gordon's luminous essay, New Developments in Legal The­
ory, in D. KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286-90 
( 1982). 
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sponsibility is far more demanding than it is often viewed, that it has 
values content in a way that respects individual choice. 
The theoretical framework that supports the effort to find non-po­
larized ways of thinking about problems is helpful in penetrating the 
question of the link between responsibility and values. Our tendency is 
to see the choice as polar. Either responsibility is the key, or values are. 
Either there is a values content to responsibility, or there is not. I n  both 
dilemmas, each pole has serious flaws. Our task is the dual one of con­
tinuing to attempt to articulate what a synthesis would look like, and 
continuing to discern how as teachers we can move and help our stu­
dents to move toward it. Our students experience the dilemma as we 
do. Some oscillate between the poles, others hold firmly to one out of 
fear of falling into the other. The dilemma, and the attempt to move 
beyond it, mirror that of the traditional and anti-traditional conscious­
ness, including the fact we are only at the beginning of the process of 
finding meaningful alternatives. I ndeed, the polar ways of experiencing 
values and responsibility is tied up with the pervasive reach and power 
of the traditional consciousness.7 
The dilemma is often posed in a static way: Suppose a student tells 
you that he or she is in law school simply to learn the rules, get the 
certificate, and head out to become a "happy rich person." Do you kick 
the student out, write him or her off as free to do it but bound for hell, 
or adopt some other unhappy variation on either oppression or surren­
der? My response is that we continually invite the student to engage 
with us over his or her choice, its implications, and the decision to take 
responsibility for it. If we continually ask students to take responsibil­
ity, do it over time, ask them to interact with one another and with the 
question, I believe that the idea of responsibility will be seen as increas­
ingly demanding, in ways that do not simply leave each of us free to 
pick our own values and tell everyone else to mind their business. As 
the student (as each of us) does that, we come into touch with our 
connection with others: not as a role, not as a moral imperative, not as 
political pressure - and not in the same way for all - but as an au­
thentic part of us. Once that happens to me (as student or teacher), I 
can choose to put the realization aside, not act on it. However, it is now 
partly me that I am putting aside, and if the question keeps coming up, 
in an endless variety of ways, it has to be continually put aside. 
Once our connection with others is acted on rather than put aside, 
7. See Delaney, Towards a Human Rights Theory of Criminal Law: A Human­
istic Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 831 (1978). 
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even in a minor context, there has been an important shift, which 
makes new shifts possible. Experiencing choice where it did not seem to 
exist before makes it more readily seem to exist the next time.8 This 
process is not linear, and in some individuals will never take hold. But 
that is not to say that it does not have enormous significance, looking at 
a group of 150 people over three years. And overall the shift has a 
values content, it is not simply that each of us becomes more himself or 
herself, whatever that may happen to be. In our society, there is a sys­
tematic strengthening of some parts of the self as we grow up, and a 
systematic weakening of others, and the process of taking responsibility 
and becoming more fully oneself strengthens the delegitimated parts. 
They tend to be the values of the alternative consciousness: the empha­
sis on equality, on relationship, on caring. 
In beginning to explore how to move towards a synthesis between 
values and responsibility, we need to proceed from the recognition that 
either divorced from the other becomes empty. The question for us as 
teachers is how to put out to students what we believe, about values 
and about responsibility. The choice is often expressed in too narrow a 
way: Do we "come out" with our values or do we keep them to our­
selves? The notion of sharing our values, rather than imposing them, 
means for me that we come out, and do it in a way that is inclusive and 
not hierarchical. A teacher's expression of values can easily be accepted 
(or rejected) by students more as the result of the teacher-student dy­
namic than of any sense of the student's evolving sense of self. "Val­
ues" can themselves become akin to a role. It is difficult to apply all of 
this, particularly in a classroom environment where the students are in 
conflict and tension.9 Many left-oriented teachers express their values 
-when they do- in ways that are intended to empower students who 
feel delegitimated by the prevailing environment. That can succeed, 
and at the same time disempower others who may disagree, or be 
frightened of the emotive words used or of the implications for their 
relations with people they care about. 
Responsibility, values, and their interaction obviously involve fun­
damental concerns and life choices that go beyond the immediate ques­
tion whether and how as teachers we "cop" to our values. They are 
present in our approach to placement, in the students' choices of work 
within any work setting, and in our work together in building the insti-
8. See my comment in E. DvoRKII'. supra note 4, at 132-133. 
9. See Lesnick, Reassessing Law Schooling: The Sterling Forest Group, 53 
NYU. L REv. 565, 567-69 (1978). 
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tution of which we are a part. An inclusive way of sharing values is 
possible, however ably done in the classroom, only in an overall learn­
ing context that is egalitarian and honors students as people. 
